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THE BACKGROUND AND PRESENT STATE OF"THE'CONTROVERSY ON SOCIAL CONTROL 
IN 'SCIENCE 
Joseph Ben-David 
Hebrew University 6 University of Chicago 
Sociology of'science is one of the most recent branches of sociology. 
Its beginnings go back to the 1920s and 30s. but in spite of the brilliance 
, of some of these, they did not give rise to a continuous tradition in the 
i 
' field. Thus the main theme of the "Foreword" by Robert K. Merton to Bernard 
, Barber. 'Science and the Social Order, 1952 is the reasons for the neglect of 
sociology of science. Barber's book was the first programmatic effort to 
1 
! present the field as fit for recognition as a regular specialty in sociology. 
It tried to show that there was enough substantive researcl~ and conceptual 
{ clarity in the field to justify such recognition. The book immediately became 
the authoritative text on the subject. and was very widely read. Dut it took 
I 
j another decade before one could speak of the emergence of the field as a 
1 sociological specialty. 
* There are a number of up to date surveys and bibliograpliies of the literature 
on the subject (Merton and Gaston, 1977; Lecuyer, 1978; Mulkay and Milic, 
1980; Gaston, 1980). and there is no point adding another one to them. 
Therefore, this paper is not intended to convey an exhaustive and balanced 
picture of the field, but rather to focus on two controversial issues. 
namely on the debates about the norms of science and the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, which--in the view of this author--are of central 
importance to the field. I have dealt with these issues in several recent 
papers, and this one is partly a continuation and partly a modificntion of 
ideas expressed in those (Ben-David, 1978; Ben-David, 1981). 
I am grateful for the Spencer Foundation for partial support of the resenrch 
on which this paper is based, and to Gad Freudentl~al for a discussion of 
the part of the paper dealing with the sociology of knowledge. 
The causes of this delay can be actually found in Science and the Social 
Order. Its wealth of empirical material was largely derived from investiga- -
tions done by non-sociologists. Thus among the classics of'the field only one, 
. ... . . .  . 
namely Robert Merton's 'science, Technology 'and Society 'in .Seventeenth Century 
England, 1939. was written by a sociologist.* And this was a study unlikely 
to find imitators among students of sociology growing up in the 1950s in the 
United States since it was based on deep historical scholarship, which was 
not souglit by that generation of sociologists. There was a paradoxical situa- 
tion in sociology. Sociological theory around 1950, influenced by the monumen- 
tal efforts of Talcott Parsons, who had just assimilated and reconceptualised 
the great tradition6 of historical and comparative sociology embedded in the 
work of Durkheim, Weberand the British social and American cultural anthropo- 
logists; but (wit11 the exception of a few individuals) this did not serve for 
the students of the fifties and the sixties as a stimulus to the acquisition 
of liistorical, ethnographic, and linguistic erudition. Parsonian theory, plus 
some of Durkheim, Weber, and other classics, revitalised through the work of 
Parsons, were studied in a disembodied way, in complete disjunction from the 
research tradition out of which they emerged, and--as a result--had relatively 
little influence on research. The training of students and the empirical 
research in the graduate departments were based on the assumption that 
* By "c.lassic" I am referring to works of recognized quality, which have 
exerted still lasting influence on the field. Two other works from the 
tliirtiea and forties would. I think. auslifv for inclusion in this cateeorv:  . - .  
J.D. Bernal. The Social Function of Science. 1939 and the essays written 
between the late thirties and the late forties and collected in M. Polanyi. 
'The Logic of Liberty. 1951. 
sociology was on its way to become "scientific" through the adoption of survey 
. . 
research as its principal methodology, since this approach enabled the aocio- 
logists to make quantifiable observations, structured according to their own 
concepts of social life, and to design.research in a manner allowing the 
testing of hypotheses. Temporarily, at least, this eliminated history from 
' 
the intellectual horizon of the large majority of sociologists. Therefore, 
neither the classic example of'Merton, nor'Barber's virtuosity in putting 
together a respectably organized body of knowledge from seemingly incoherent 
bits and pieces of studies and comments were sufficient to inspire even a 
small group large enough for a specialty. 
The opportunity for this emerged in 1957, as a result of a combination 
of external and internal events. The external event was the launching of the 
Sputnik which gave rise to efforts at accelerating scientific and technological 
growth in the Western countries and created widespread interest in sociology 
of science as a discipline presumably capable of contributing to the under- 
standing of the conditions and mechanisms of such growth. The internal event 
: was a paper by Merton based on many years of research on independent mul.tiple 
discoveries, which gave to this old theme a new meaning by focusing not on the 
fact of multiple discovery, but on the phenomenon frequently accompanying it, 
namely clashes about claims to priority between the different discoverers 
(Merton, 1957). Although this, like the earlier works of Merton. was based 
on historical research, it focused attention on the importance of competition, 
allocation of rewards, social control and stratification in science, which 
were issues amenable to quantitative study. This opened the way to the articu- 
lation of sociology of science with theoretical issues central to sociology, 
and suitable to be studied quantitatively through survey research and analysis 
of data on publications. awards and career mobility (Hagstrom, 1965; Zuckerman, 
1967; Crane, 1967; 1969; Hargens 6 Hagstrom, 1967; Merton, 1968; Gaston, 1973; 
Cole and Cole. 1973). This was crucial for the success of'sciology of science 
as a specialty in American sociology (which--around 1960--was tantamount as 
succeas in world,sociology), since it made possible to conduct investigations 
with the aid of concepts and methods basic to graduate training in sociology.* 
The opportunities for the use of advanced methodologies increased greatly in 
the sixties, thanks to the rich data base provided by the Science Citation 
Index. This is not to say that there were no other kinds of interest in the 
sociology of science. There were two other lines of research which looked as 
good prospects from the point of view of the requirements of graduate training. 
One was the microsociological study of scientific organizations from the point 
of view of effectiveness of research management (Shepard, 1956; Kaplan, 1965; 
Glaser. 1964; Allen, 1966; Gordon and Marquis, 1966; Pelz and Andrews, 1966; 
Allen and Cohen. 1969). These studies have, indeed, had an uninterrupted 
development since the fifties, but in the Western countries they became. 
separated from the mainstream of sociology of science, and have been inte- 
grated with general management studies. In the communist countries of Europe, 
however, they are of central importance in the sociology of science (Mulkay 
1980). 
* The relationship between the two events, Sputnik and Merton's priority 
paper was entirely coincidental. Merton's paper did not deal with the 
kinds of problems relevant to the issues raised by the Russian techno- 
logical success. But they interacted and contributed jointly to the 
emergence of sociology of science as a recognized specialty. 
The second line of research suitable for graduate training has been the 
study of scientific coouhunication and cooperation, which were so to speak 
obvious social processes and could be linked to the general study of the flow 
of communications (Menzel, 1966) and the sociometry of groups. These studies 
received great impetus from Price (1963) and the Sciepce Citation Index. Price 
showed how the application of demographic methods, and analyses of authorship 
and co-authorship could teach a great deal about the rise and decline of 
scientific specialties and the Citation Index provided extremely rich source 
material for the performance of complex sociometric analyses of scientific 
networks. Indeed there has been a succession of publications in this area. 
but they have never had such a clear cut focus as the studies of the reward 
system (Hagstrom, 1965; Price and Beaver, 1966; Griffith 6 Miller, 1970; 
Griffith and Small, 1-11, 1974; Small, 1973, 1977; Gilbert 6 Woolgar, 1974; 
Breiger, 1976; Sullivan, White 6 Barboni, 1977a. 1977b; Chubin. 1976; Friedkin. 
1978). Furthermore, serious criticism was raised against the use of the 
Citation Index and the purely sociometric approach to the analysis of the rise 
and decline of specialties, on the ground that citations are neither reliable 
nor valid indexes of communication and cooperation, and it has been suggested 
that quantitative analyses should be trusted only if corroborated by direct 
historical evidence (Cohen-Shanin, 1975; Gilbert, 1977; Edge, 1979). Indeed, 
there were throughout this period sociological studies of scientific diacip- 
lines, and growth using purely qualitative data, or quantitative data in 
conjunction with qualitative ones (Ben-David, 1960a, 1960b; Ben-David and 
Zloczower, 1962; Zloczower, n.d.; Ben-David and Collins 1966; Fischer, 1966, 
1967; Crane, 1967; Mullins, 1968). 
Throughout the sixties work in sociology of science was centered in 
American sociology departments engaged.principally in studies of the 
scientific reward system, stratification:and, to a smaller extent, specialty 
networks with an emphasis on their sociometric aspects. Elsewhere--with the 
exception of science msmagement studies'in Eastern Europe--the field was still 
represented by individuals rather than groups, not all of whom were profes- 
sional sociologists. But there was sufficient world-wide interest to launch 
a Research Committee on the Sociology of Science in the framework of the 
International Sociological Association in 1966. In 1962 Edward Shils began 
publishing Minerva (in London); and sessions devoted to the field at the 
meetings of the American Sociological Association drew large audiences. By 
1970 the field seemed to be set for rapid and continuous development. One of 
the most promising features of this new branch of sociology was, that in 
contrast to many other branches, which were by that time torn by controversies, 
there was in sociology of science a high degree of consenses on basic intel- 
lectual matters. Some of the practitioners attributed this to the beneficial 
disciplining effect of the proximity of the field to the natural sciences. 
I1 
There was, indeed, continued development, but controversy and conflict 
caught up with the field with a vengeance. Proximity to the natural sciences 
which was a source of consensus in the sixties. became the main source of 
conflict in the seventies. These unexpected developments were due to a number 
of circumstances which transformed the social composition of the field and 
its social functions. 
Throughout the sixties there was much concern In Europe with the 
scientific and technological backwardness of Europe compared to the United 
I States. This concern drew attention to sociology of science, as concern with 
Soviet superiority in space technology drew attention to the field in the 
late fifties. But because the gap between the United States in Europe was 
: more real and general than that between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the general interest in sociology of science was more enduring in 
Europe. Science policy becsme one of the most important concerns of the OECD, 
and was widely reported on in the press and debated in various houses of 
legislature. Civil servants, politicians and scientific statesmen were all 
! interested in sociology of science, as a field of potential use in the reforma- 
tion of scientific institutions and the acceleration of scientific and techno- 
logical growth in Europe. 
This practical, "lay" interest had several repercussions on.the develop- 
ment of the field. It greatly facilitated the establishment of special insti- 
tutional arrangements for research and teaching in the sociology, economics 
and politics of science, such as the Science Policy Research Unit at the 
University of Sussex, the Science Studies Unit at the University of Ediborough, 
and attracted a number of younger scholars trained in experimental science, 
philosophy, or'history of science to the field. Because of the practical and 
extradisciplinary origins of much of'the interests in, and some of the 
practitioners of the field, the new'institutions were usually conceived as 
interdisciplinary ventures. They were'institutions for the "social study," 
rather than "sociology of science." Thus, a significant part of sociology 
of science in Europe, especially in Britain, has been practiced in interdiscip- 
linary units. rather than departments of sociology. 
From the perspective of this--to a large extent interdisciplinary and 
policy oriented background--the interests of sociologists of science in the 
reward system, norms, and stratification in science appeared as narrow and 
parochial. It was disappointing that much of sociology of science was about 
the sociology of the scientific profession. and less about the contents of 
science and matters of science policy. During the seventies this dissatis- 
faction with the state of the field assumed a critical tone. This was probably 
related to the emergence of critical and hostile attitudes toward science and 
higher education in general, but the contents of the criticism were determined 
, 
by problems immanent to sociology in general and the sociology of science in 
particular. The criticism focused on two issues: on the alleged deficiencies 
of the structural-functional approach in sociology of science, particularly 
on the use of "scientific norms'' as a key concept in the description and 
interpretation of the institutional framework of science (Mulkay, 1969; 
Barnes 6 Dolby. 1970); and on the absence of a sociology of scientific know- 
ledge (Barnes. 1974; Bloor, 1976; Mulkay, 1979) 
111 
Criticism of the use of scientific norms derived from the more general 
criticism of structural-functionalism in aociolo~y. In debates on this subject 
in the fifties and sixties, the theory was attacked on the grounds of postu- 
lating common values and norms as important explanatory concepts, and stressing 
the theme of social homeostasis, instead of looking beyond such appearances 
and discovering the conflicts, negotiations, divergences of meanings and 
constant changes which go on behind the conventions of normative behavior and 
the semblance of social equilibrium. The tendency of stressing common values, 
norms and social equilibrium was attributed by some of the critics to political 
conservatism (Dahrendorf, 1958; Gouldner, 1970). 
Parts of this criticism were of particular interest to sociology of 
, science. The concept of "norms of science," meaning a code of professional 
ethics obligatory for scientists, such as judging scientific work in a 
universalistic and disinterested manner, publishing research results in a way 
to make it accessible to others, or "organized skepticism," which-- in principle- 
, leaves open every theory to reexamination on the basis of new argument and 
evidence, was used a great deal in the sociology of science of the sixties 
(Storer, 1966). and conformity to or deviance from these norms featured 
heavily in all the studies of scientific rewards and social control in science. 
No one asserted that there was universal conformity with these norms and in 
fact both papers of Merton (1942. 1957 in Merton. 1973) which introduced 
their study in sociology were concerned with deviations from them (by Nazi 
scientists, and by many others in fights about priority). But all sociologists 
took it for granted that these norms were generally known and approved of by 
scientists, and that there were effective social controls in science to 
enforce conformity with them. In fact:they considered these controls in 
science as singularly effective and,.regarded science as a model'for the study 
of social control and consensus formation. These strong assumptions about 
tile norms of science made sociology of'science a particularly interesting 
challenge for those who were skeptical about the sociological usefulness of 
the concept of norms altogether. If it could be shown that in science--which 
was considered as the social institution with the most effective controls to 
enforce norms--deviance from the alleged institutional norms is no less 
characteristic than conformity with them, then this would effectively under- 
mine the entire structural functionalist approach based on the assumption of 
the existence of different norms characteristic of each social institution. 
This gave rise to an extensive debate, and some empirical research on 
this issue. The empirical research is of three kinds: statistical investiga- 
tions of the behavior of scientists in matters, such as recognition, citation, 
or the awarding of prizes, in order to test their consistency with the norms 
of science, which is, of course, a direct continuation of the tradition of 
studies of the scientific reward system (Blume and Sinclair, 1973; Cole and 
Cole, 1973; Gaston, 1978) attitude surveys of scientists with questions 
supposedly reflecting conformity or non-conformity with the norms (Blissett, 
1972; Toren, 1980); and detailed studies of scientific controversies in 
order to discover the actual rules of behavior followed by those involved in 
them (Mulkay, 1969; Mitroff, 1974; Collins, 1974, 1975; Wynne, 1976) .  
The results are seemingly contradictory. Those of the statistical 
studles of scientific judgements and allocation of rewards support the 
structural functional view of the existence of considerable conformity with 
the professional ethos (or norms) of science. The outcomes of the attitude 
surveys are not clear, since they show'conformity on some items, not on 
others, and because the outcomes of'.the'different studies are inconsistent 
with each other. Finally the cnse studies'show'little conformity with the 
norms, producing instead a bewildering.variety of considerations and "rules" 
resorted to by participants in controveriies; and revealing a process of 
reaching agreement through "negotiation!', which is interpreted as inconsistent 
with the existence of consensual norms.of.conduct among scientists. 
Critics of the structural-functional use of norms:choose as.more 
convincing the case studies, and deal with the problem presented by the 
' studies of the reward system by suggesting (however not in a very detailed 
way) that the outcomes of those studies'can also be interpreted in ways not 
necessarily involving conformity with the scientific norms (Mulkay and Milic. 
1980). 
It seems to me that this interpretation is erroneous, and that. in 
fact, the three sets of studies do not contradict each other, but present a 
coherent and consistent picture, with each kind of study illuminating different 
parts of it. 
The studies of the rewards system, as well as the entire structural- 
functional theory on the importance of professional ethos. in general, are 
silent about the behavior and motivations of individual scientists, and about 
the decision making process in individual cases. They only assume that there 
are institutional mechanisms which in the aggregate and the long run try to 
enforce conformity with the moral norms of the profession. This aggregate 
behavior is what the studies of the reward system are concerned with and all 
that they claim to show is that there is an aggregate tendency to conformity 
with the norms. 
The findings of the case studies do not contradict any of this. They 
throw important new light on that part of'the process of scientific evaluation 
which consists ofthe classification'of'the factual, cognitive aspects of 
particular instances, and the foriulation' and ' interpretation of' methodological 
and logical principles appropriate to them. Moral issues are rarely raised 
in these debates, since conformity is usually assumed. When there is an 
accusation that some of those involved in the process did not act according 
to these norms. however, this is taken seriously. Thus rejection of the very 
unusual cosmological ideas of Velikovsky without examlnation of the evidence 
was widely challenged (although few believed that he was right), and it was 
felt by representatives of the scientific community that the accusations 
required answer (De Grazia. 1966; Polanyi. 1967). A reverse of this case 
occurred in the controversy following A. Jensen's paper on the importance of 
heredity in the explanation of differences in the intelligence quotients of 
blacks and whites (Jensen. 1969). This paper was seen by some as advocacy 
for racial prejudice, and was also severely criticized for empirical and 
metl~odological shortcomings. Although some of the critics used scientifically 
acceptable arguments, it was suspected that they went in their criticism beyond 
accepted cognitive standards and procedures in the field. This question was 
considered as important enough for detailed discussion and censure (Barnes, 
1974; Cronback. 1975).* 
* Barnes uses this case in order to show that it can be analysed without 
recourse to norms of science. What he actually shows, however is 
that the application of methodological rules is less than equivocal. 
But the moral question of universalism which he implicitly,raises is 
ur~equivocal. 
These cases show that the critics of the normative approach confuse 
cognitive judgement with moral norhs.about the behavior proper for'those 
exercising scientific judgement. What the case studies on the conduct of 
scientific controversies examine is the scientific parallel to the court pro- 
cedure of fact finding through examination of conflicting evidence, presented, 
frequently, in a biased way, and the determination of the legally relevant 
aspects of the evidence. This is an entirely cognitive process, and like all 
, such processes, it is subject to many doubts, inaccuracies and uncertainties. 
Moral norms cannot eliminate cognitive difficulties, but they can, and do, 
provide some kind of control on the behavior of scientists, making it diffi- 
cult to discriminate openly against any person or theory on grounds external 
to science ("universslism"). In the Velikovsky case of rejection of a theory 
without proper examination, the question is contextual. namely whether this 
norm was transgressed by denying hearing to an outsider who uses ideas and 
1 methods completely different from those accepted at that time by scientists; 
in the Jensen case the question was whether the way in which apparently correct 
procedures were used was not actually discriminatory. The moral norm itself 
has not been in doubt in these cases. 
This interpretation is also consistent with the ambiguity of findings of 
attitude surveys. This is probably the result of the conceptual difficulty 
of distinguishing between cognitive rules and moral norms, and, of making 
unequivocally clear the context within which these rules and norms apply.* 
* For example, Toren finds weak support--51 percent--for the norm of 
"disinterestedness" on the basis of argeement or disagreement with the 
statement: "Scientists need not be motivated solely by the contribu- 
tion of their work to scientific knowledge; they have a right to choose 
projects which will enhance their reputation and personal interest." 
But in a different context she finds that the norm of "utility"--to 
judge work mainly by its practical usefulness--is rejected by 68 per 
Therefore, the terms in which much of'this debate has been conducted 
throughout the seventies are beside.the point. The research reviewed here-- 
on which the debate about the norms is based-- shows that there are relatively 
stable moral norms (see also Ezrahi, 1980) .  but their application, like that 
of of all norms, is dependent on context. namely on the definition of the 
situation as falling within the accepted boundaries of scientific work, and 
probably also on whether a given scientist acts in the role of contestant in 
a scientific debate, or in that of the judge or referee (Ben-David, 1977) .  
The main difficulty, however, arises from the fact that the moral code has to 
be applied to cognitive processes of evaluation of evidence and examination 
of arguments (Zuckerman, 1977). These processes are complicated and subject 
to R variety of more or less stable criteria and much less stable rules of 
interpretations, and considerations of particular circumstances (Kuhn, 1977; 
Zuckerman, 1977). Much of the argument about the non-existence or a "negoti- 
ability" of the norms of science derives from a confusion of the normative 
moral process with the cognitive one. 
This is not to say that the debate on scientific norms which took place 
in the seventies was entirely futile. It has had the useful function of 
drawing' attention to the contextual variation in normative behavior, and-- 
more importantly--to the need for articulating the application of moral norms 
with the procedures of cognitive evaluation of evidence and argument. This 
* (continued from preceding page) 
is a very important shift of emphasis and a definite broadening of the horizon 
of the field. Instead of'choosing for'investigation the most formally insti- 
tutionalized aspects of science in which social control is most effective, 
sociologists of science are willing to look now at processes on the margins 
of institutional boundaries, and on the complex relationship between social 
control and cognitive evaluation in science. without which the study of social 
control in science was a somewhat'abstract concern, far removed from the 
, daily concerns of scientists. 
cent (Toren. 1980). This latter can be regarded as a better item actually 
used for that purpose. since the "utility" item relates to the context of 
public judgement, the "disinterestedness" one to the context of individual 
decisions, in which one tends to be much more lenient towards considerations 
of personal circumstances, such as financial needs. or problems of finding 
employment. 
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